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"TWENTY QUESTIONS" DOESN'T YIELD DUE PROCESS:
CHANEY V. BROWN AND THE CONTINUED NEED TO
OPEN PROSECUTOR'S FILES IN CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS
INTRODUCTION
"A murder trial-indeed any criminal proceeding-is not a sporting
event."' In order to avoid such an atmosphere and to assure the crimi-
nal defendant the fair trial which it has held she is entitled to under the
Constitution, 2 the Supreme Court has greatly expanded the defendant's
right of access to evidence held by the prosecutor which may either lead
to acquittal or mitigate the severity of punishment. 3 This is especially
true in capital offense proceedings. 4 The Court, however, in two sepa-
rate lines of cases, has inconsistently defined the amount of access to
which the defendant is entitled.
The Brady v. Maryland 5 and United States v. Agurs 6 line of cases holds
that the defendant's right to exculpatory evidence depends on (1) the
degree to which the evidence is exculpatory, 7 and (2) how actively the
defense has sought its disclosure. 8 The Lockett v. Ohio9 line of cases
holds that a criminal defendant must be allowed to present any exculpa-
tory evidence or mitigating circumstance during the sentencing phase of
her trial. 10
In Chaney v. Brown,' a recent Tenth Circuit case, these standards
were considered concurrently for the first time. 12 The court implicitly
concluded that the Brady-Agurs evidentiary disclosure standard does not
assure fair trials.13 Consequently, the court applied the Lockett standard
1. Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 102 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring).
2. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,
87 (1963). See also Scurr v. Niccum, 620 F.2d 186, 190 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Beasley, 576 F.2d 626, 630 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 947 (1979); United States
v. Miller, 529 F.2d 1125, 1129 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 924 (1976); United States ex
rel Almeida v. Baldi, 195 F.2d 815, 819 (3d Cir. 1952). See infra note 166.
3. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
4. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
5. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
6. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
7. Id. at 110-11.
S. id. at 104-07.
9. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
10. Id. at 604. For a general discussion of Lockett v. Ohio and subsequent cases, see
notes 99-109 and accompanying text.
11. 730 F.2d 1334 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 601 (1984).
12. Chaney, 730 F.2d at 1336. In Chaney, the Tenth Circuit discussed the interplay
among three doctrines: Brady-Agurs; Lockett; and Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
Although only briefly addressed in this paper, the Enmund doctrine sets forth the require-
ment that a defendant must kill, attempt or intend to kill, or contemplate that a life will be
taken before a death sentence will be imposed. Id. at 788.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 158-62.
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and reversed the lower court's decision.' 4 While the Tenth Circuit's de-
cision soundly applied Lockett, the court, of course, could not overrule
the Supreme Court and dispense with the inadequacies of the Brady-
Agurs standard. It remains the Supreme Court's task to adopt Lockett as
the standard controlling prosecutorial disclosure at all stages of criminal
trials. The only certain means of accomplishing this, and of assuring fair
criminal trials, is to end the current game of "Twenty Questions"' 15
played in criminal discovery by opening prosecutorial files to unfettered
defense inspection. 16
The Supreme Court recently declined to hear Chaney on appeal.
17
By denying Oklahoma's petition for a writ of certiorari, the Court has
allowed the Tenth Circuit's holding that Lockett controls the
prosecutorial duty to disclose to stand. Unfortunately, the denial also
signals the court's unwillingness or inability to end the confusion sur-
rounding the prosecutor's duty to disclose by taking the necessary fur-
ther step to assuring criminal defendants fair trials and sentencing
hearings: opening prosecutor's files to defense inspection.
Moreover, Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices Rehnquist and
White, dissented from the denial of certiorari, expressing a desire actu-
ally to decrease the prosecutor's duty to disclose. The dissent not only
ignores Lockett but also suggests significant limitations on the standard
of Agurs.18 Overall, it implies that if the faction of the Court which has
sought to limit criminal defendant's rights becomes dominant through
future appointments to the Court, the criminal defendant's opportunity
to receive a fair trial may be thwarted to an even greater extent than at
present.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Brady-Agurs Case Line
The prosecutorial duty to reveal exculpatory evidence first emerged
in the area of perjured testimony. The Supreme Court held in Mooney v.
Holohan19 that a verdict of guilty could not stand where the prosecution
knowingly used false, contrived testimony to obtain a conviction. 20 The
Court here suggested for the first time that the acts of a prosecuting
14. Id.
15. See Beatty, The Ability to Suppress Exculpatory Evidence: Let's Cut Off the Prosecutor's
Hands, 17 IDAHO L. REV. 237, 242 (1981). "Twenty Questions" is a children's game. One
child secretly picks the name of a person, place or thing for another child to identify. The
other child may ask the first up to twenty questions in attempting to identify this secretly
chosen noun. As Beatty points out, the Agurs "specific request" standard closely resem-
bles this game, but the consequences of losing are far more grave for criminal defendants.
16. See infra notes 163-75 and accompanying text.
17. See supra note 11.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 176-93.
19. 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
20. Mooney, a known radical labor leader, was convicted at trial for a murder result-
ing from a parade bombing. It later became clear that he was in no way involved with the
bombing; the prosecution had framed him with false testimony. Id. at 110.
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attorney, by themselves, could amount to a denial of due process. 21
In Pyle v. Kansas,22 the Court held that the prosecution's deliberate
suppression of evidence favorable to the defendant could be as much a
denial of due process as the employment of false testimony.
2 3
Following the Supreme Court's lead in Mooney and Pyle, the Third
Circuit held in United States ex rel Almeida v. Baldi 2 4 that both the suppres-
sion of physical evidence and the suppression of evidence relevant to
punishment deprived a criminal defendant of due process. 25 Almeida
was convicted of felony first degree murder for a policeman's death dur-
ing a robbery.2 6 Suppressed physical evidence strongly indicated that a
fellow officer had accidentally killed the policeman. 27 Although the
court held that the jury could have found Almeida guilty of felony mur-
der despite this evidence under Pennsylvania's felony murder statute,
the evidence certainly mitigated in favor of a lighter sentence. 28 Be-
cause Almeida had exhausted all state remedies, the court affirmed the
lower court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. 29 Since the prosecutor
deliberately suppressed evidence in Baldi,3 0 the holding was a logical
extension of the rule in Pyle to all phases of the criminal trial.
In 1959, the Supreme Court further extended the reasoning of
Mooney in Napue v. Illinois.3 1 The prosecution's primary witness falsely
testified that the prosecution had not promised to reduce his sentence if
he cooperated. While the prosecutor had not elicited this testimony, he
knew it was false and failed to correct it. 32 The Court held that even if
the prosecutor's omission was not in bad faith it prejudiced the defend-
ant's trial for felony murder.33 The Court therefor reversed the lower
21. The Supreme Court denied leave to file a Petition for Writ of Certiorari because
state remedies had not been exhausted, id. at 115, but stated that "the acts or omissions of
a prosecuting attorney can . .. in and by themselves, amount either to due process of law or
to a denial of due process of law." Id. at 111-12 (emphasis in the original).
22. 317 U.S. 213 (1942).
23. Id. at 215-16.
24. 195 F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1952).
25. Id. at 820. Pennsylvania's felony murder statute, 18 P.S. PA. § 4701 (1939), pro-
vided that accomplices to a felony resulting in death could be found guilty of first degree
murder. The court found that "[wlho killed [the policeman shot in the affray, however,]
was a relevant issue, as to penalty to be imposed by the jury at the trial, perhaps the most
relevant one." Id. at 819.
26. Id. at 816.
27. Following the gun battle during which the policeman was killed, investigators at
the scene found a .45 caliber bullet indicating that Almeida was armed with a .45 caliber
gun. They also found a bloody .38 caliber bullet behind where the dead policeman's body
had lain, indicating that the policeman had been shot by a fellow officer carrying a stan-
dard issue police revolver. The prosecution did not enter either bullet in evidence. Id. at
817.
28. See supra note 25.
29. Id. at 821-25.
30. Id. at 818.
31. 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
32. Id. at 267-68.
33. "That the district attorney's silence was not the result of guile or a desire to preju-
dice matters little, for its impact was the same, preventing, as it did, a trial that could in any
real sense be termed fair." Id. at 270 (quoting People v. Savvides, I N.Y.2d 554, 557, 136
N.E.2d 853, 854-55, 154 N.Y.S.2d 885, 887 (1956)).
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court's denial of the defendant's motion for a writ of coram nobis. 3 4
The Napue holding marked a dramatic shift away from the focus in
prior cases on prosecutorial culpability. The prosecutor had neither in-
tentionally elicited nor intentionally failed to correct the testimony. The
defendant had nevertheless been denied a fair trial and the court's con-
cern was this denial. Its gaze shifted further away from consideration of
prosecutorial conduct, now focusing almost exclusively on what impact
the supression of evidence had on the defendant's opportunity to re-
ceive a fair trial.
Two Second Circuit decisions decided soon after Napue reveal the
form this shift of attention took in lower federal courts. United States v.
Consolidated Laundries Corp. 3 5 and Kyle v. United States 3 6 both concerned
the mysterious disappearance of documents critical to the defense from
prosecutor's files.3 7 In Consolidated Laundries, the court concluded that
the suppression was negligent, not deliberate.3 8 In Kyle, the court re-
manded for determination of this issue.3 9 In both cases, however, the
court's reasoning centered on due process and fairness; regardless of
the context in which the documents disappeared, the defendants' inabil-
ity to take advantage of whatever exculpatory value the documents had
deprived them of fair trials. 40 Fundamental fairness alone demanded
that the outcome in both cases be reconsidered in light of the
nondisclosures.
In the landmark case Brady v. Maryland,4 ' the Supreme Court held
that suppression of exculpatory evidence after the defendant had re-
quested its disclosure violated due process when the evidence was mate-
rial to the defendant's guilt or innocence irrespective of the
prosecution's good or bad faith in suppressing it. Brady and his accom-
plice Boblit were found guilty of felony first degree murder and sen-
tenced to death. 42 Police had obtained several written confessions from
both men shortly after their arrests, each defendant claiming that the
other had actually strangled the victim and that the killing was separate
and distinct from the robbery.43 However, in one such confession which
34. Napue, 360 U.S. at 266-67, 272.
35. 291 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1961) (the misplacement of files containing evidence impor-
tant for the defense warranted a new trial).
36. 297 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1961) (the inference of misplacement of files important for
the defense warranted a hearing on defendant's motion for an order vacating sentence and
an inquiry into the facts).
37. Consolidated Laundries, 291 F.2d at 568; Kyle, 297 F.2d at 509-11.
38. 291 F.2d at 570.
39. 297 F.2d at 514-15.
40. In Consolidated Laundries, the court based its decision on the need for "the correct
administration of criminal justice in the Federal courts" rather than determining whether a
negligent suppression violated due process. The decision rests on fairness, however, since
rendering criminal justice inevitably requires fairness in the conduct of proceedings. 291
F.2d at 591. In Kyle, decided three months after Consolidated Laundries, the court bases its
opinion entirely upon "the basic principles of fair play embodied in the due process clause
. . 297 F.2d at 513.
41. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
42. Brady v. State, 226 Md. 422, 174 A.2d 167 (1961).
43. 226 Md. at 426, 174 A.2d at 169.
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he did not sign, Boblit admitted that he killed the victim. 4 4 Believing
this confession inadmissible for lack of Boblit's signature, the prosecu-
tor did not produce it, though Brady's counsel had requested copies of
all such statements.
4 5
The Maryland Court of Appeals held that, under Maryland law, the
jury could convict Brady of felony first degree murder despite Boblit's
confession because the homicide occurred during an armed robbery.
4 6
Therefore, the undisclosed statements were not admissible on the issue
of guilt and a new trial on this issue was not required. 4 7 Disclosure of
the statement might, however, have affected imposition of the death
penalty. 4 8 Consequently, the court remanded for a trial de novo on the
issue of punishment only.4 9 The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that
evidence favorable to the accused and material to either his guilt or pun-
ishment must be disclosed if requested. 50 Thus, the Brady decision fol-
lowed the lower federal decisions emphasizing the need for fair trials
rather than the punishment of prosecutorial misconduct. The Brady
Court, however, significantly changed the fairness standard applied in
the lower federal courts. The Court based its evaluation of whether the
defendant's trial was fair absent undisclosed evidence, in large part, on
whether the defense had actively sought disclosure of that evidence.
5 1
Criticism of this significant change in the fairness standard soon
emerged-from within the Supreme Court. Giles v. Maryland 5 2 involved
the nondisclosure of evidence that indicated the falsity of rape charges
brought against several youths. 53 The majority declined to rule on the
nondisclosure because there were enough other questions present to
warrant remand without considering this issue. It concluded that there
was no violation of the rule in Napue even though one witness' factually
accurate statements were misleading.
54
In a pointed concurrence, Justice Fortas stated that, though he
would defer to the decision of his brethren to remand, he found the
circumstances of the nondisclosure sufficient to vacate the conviction
and order a retrial. 55 In reaching this conclusion, he reasoned that the
state had a constitutional duty to disclose evidence tending to exonerate
44. Id.
45. Brady, 373 U.S. at 84.
46. Brady, 226 Md. at 430, 174 A.2d at 171. See MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 410 (1957).
47. Brady, 226 Md. at 430, 174 A.2d at 171.
48. Id.
49. Id. 226 Md. at 431, 174 A.2d at 172.
50. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 ("We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good or bad faith of the pros-
ecution" (emphasis added)).
51. Id. Prior cases focused solely on prosecutorial conduct and fairness, not on de-
fense requests. See supra notes 19-28 and accompanying text.
52. 386 U.S. 66 (1967).
53. The undisclosed evidence tended to show that the prosecutrix (1) had consented
to the intercourse; (2) had formerly brought false rape charges; (3) was promiscuous;
(4) was mentally unstable; and (5) had perjured herself at trial. Id. at 70-75.
54. Id. at 81.
55. Id. at 99.
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or otherwise aid a defendant. 56 Therefore, the defense-request aspect
of the rule in Brady should be viewed as nothing more than an "in-
clude[d]. . . reference," not a factor upon which the fairness evaluation
should turn.
5 7
In the cases that followed Giles, confusion mounted as to the signifi-
cance of a defense request for disclosure. For example, the Second Cir-
cuit held in United States v. Keogh 58 that, where the prosecutor had not
deliberately suppressed evidence, the absence of a defense request for
disclosure was relevant in determining whether the nondisclosure con-
stituted error.59 This ruling represented a retreat to the standards of
Mooney and Pyle ;60 once again, a federal court was determining fairness
by evaluating prosecutorial conduct.
Two subsequent Supreme Court cases further clouded the meaning
and application of the Brady rule. In Giglio v. United States,6 1 it was un-
clear whether the prosecution had intentionally or negligently sup-
pressed evidence tending to impeach the credibility of its chief witness
in a forgery case. 6 2 The Court held that where such evidence was mate-
rial, a defense request for the evidence was not a necessary prerequisite
to finding that the suppression constituted error.63 This holding indi-
cated that the Court was relegating the Brady request standard to a posi-
tion of secondary importance, but the opinion did not distinguish or
overrule Koegh.
The implication of Giglio proved false. Only four months later, the
Supreme Court revitalized the Brady request standard in Moore v. Illi-
nois,64 holding that a key factor in determining fairness was whether the
prosecution had suppressed evidence following a defense request for its
56. "[The state has a] constitutional duty, as I see it, voluntarily to disclose material in
its exclusive possession which is exonerative or helpful to the defense-which the State
will not affirmatively use to prove guilt-and which it should not conceal." Id. at 10 1-02
(Fortas, J., concurring).
57. Although this Court included in its statement of the controlling principle [in
Brady] a reference to counsel's request .. .I see no reason to make the result
turn on the adventitious circumstance of a request. If the defense does not know
of the existence of the evidence, it may not be able to request its production. A
murder trial-indeed any criminal proceeding-is not a sporting event.
Id. at 102 (Fortas, J., concurring).
58. 391 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1968).
59. "We cannot agree with petitioner that where there has not been a deliberate sup-
pression [of evidence] . ..the absence of a [defense] request is irrelevant." Id. at 147.
60. See supra text accompanying notes 19-23.
61. 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
62. The United States government prosecuted the case. One assistant attorney inter-
viewed the witness, Taliento, and promised him immunity from prosecution for conspiracy
if he testified against Giglio. Another assistant attorney conducted the prosecution and
was unaware of this promise. Thus, when Taliento testified at trial that he had not been
promised immunity, the latter attorney did not correct him. Id. at 251-53.
63. In fact, the Giglio Court stated the Brady rule inaccurately, completely evading the
defense request issue: "Brady v. Maryland... held that suppression of material evidence
justifies a new trial 'irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.' " d. at
153.
64. 408 U.S. 786 (1972).
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disclosure.65 Moore's counsel had argued, probably after reading Giles
and Keogh, that a defense request was not an "indispensable prerequi-
site" to a finding of unfairness. 6 6 The Court disagreed.
Uncertainty surrounding the Brady rule peaked in Davis v. Heyd,6 7 a
1973 Fifth Circuit case in which the court reached the same conclusion
Justice Fortas had reached six years earlier in Giles. In Davis, the defend-
ant did not request production of certain highly exculpatory statements,
which would have supported a plea of self-defense at his manslaughter
trial, because he did not know they existed. 6 8 The court held that re-
quiring a request for unknown evidence so material in nature served no
useful purpose and could not be a prerequisite to enforcement of the
defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial.
69
The Brady decision thus left many questions unanswered for lower
courts, and subsequent Supreme Court cases failed to provide any addi-
tional guidance. A precise definition of materiality was lacking, 70 as
were any firm criteria for the necessity of a defense request. Despite this
confusion, the Supreme Court unwaiveringly held that the defendant
was not entitled to an open inspection of prosecutorial files. 7'
In United States v. Agurs,7 2 the Court sought to remove the ambigui-
ties surrounding the duty to disclose. Agurs was convicted of second
degree murder.7 3 She filed a motion for a new trial, pleading that the
prosecutor's failure to divulge her victim's prior criminal convictions for
assault and carrying a deadly weapon deprived her of evidence to sup-
port her defense that she killed him in self-defense. 74 She had not, how-
ever, requested production of this evidence. 7 5 The Court reversed the
appellate court's grant of her motion, 76 holding the evidence not suffi-
ciently material to merit a new trial. 7 7 It did, however, restate the rule in
Giglio7 8 as a caveat: where evidence is undeniably exculpatory, the pros-
ecution must disclose it even absent a request. 79 It also reaffirmed its
prior rule that trial findings must be overturned where the prosecution
65. Id. at 794-95. (Other key factors included whether the undisclosed evidence was
favorable and material.)
66. Id. at 794.
67. 479 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1973).
68. Id. at 454.
69. Id.
70. It was unclear after these cases whether "material" went only to the exculpatory
nature of the evidence itself or went to both the exculpatory nature of. and the defense's
diligence in seeking out, the evidence.
71. Moore, 408 U.S. at 795 ("We know of no constitutional requirement that the pros-
ecution make a complete and detailed accounting to the defense of all police investigatory
work on a case"); Miller, 529 F.2d at 1129 ("Contrary to his argument, Miller is not enti-
tled to an open inspection of the government files"). See supra note 2.
72. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
73. Id. at 98.
74. Id. at 100.
75. Id. at 101.
76. Id. at 102.
77. Id. at 113-14.
78. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
79. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110-11.
1984]
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knowingly employs perjured testimony.
80
The new law promulgated in Agurs concerned evidence of less-than-
certain exculpatory value. The Court adopted a bifurcated standard for
the disclosure of evidence. 8 1 If the defense had "specifically" requested
evidence or information, such a request would place the prosecution on
notice of precisely what the defense wanted and obligate it to respond
virtually without exception. 8 2 In such cases, the Court held that Brady,
fairly interpreted, required that if the defense could later show that the
undisclosed evidence "might have affected the outcome of the trial," a new
trial would be appropriate. 83 Where the request was merely "general,"
however, consisting of boilerplate language requesting only the disclo-
sure of "anything exculpatory," the prosecution would have no firm in-
dication of what the defense was seeking. 8 4 In this instance, the
undisclosed evidence would have to be so significant that it "create[s] a
reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist" before a new trial would
be merited.
8 5
The import of the Agurs opinion is revealed in Scurr v. Niccum, 86 an
Eighth Circuit case holding that the materiality of nondisclosed evidence
must initially be determined based on whether the defense's request was
"specific" or "general." '8 7 Thus, the court did not determine materiality
of evidence based upon whether that evidence tended to prove inno-
cence or guilt. Rather, it based materiality upon whether defense coun-
sel had requested the evidence. Other lower federal cases have since
held that the materiality of nondisclosed evidence must be determined
based on an evaluation of its significance in light of all of the evidence
actually admitted at trial 88 and that, where more than one piece of evi-
dence is not disclosed, the court must consider the materiality of each
piece not only individually but also in the context of all pieces. 8 9
B. The Lockett Case Line
The second line of cases meriting close examination in evaluating
the Chaney decision concerns the admissibility of mitigating evidence in
the sentencing phase of capital offense trials. In a 197 non-capital
case, 90 the Supreme Court held that the defendant's right to a just sen-
tence required the sentencer to consider both the circumstances of the
crime and the character of the defendant when imposing punishment. 9 1
80. Id. at 103. See supra notes 19 & 20 and accompanying text.
81. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104-07.
82. Id. at 106 ("When the prosecution receives a specific and relevant request, the
failure to make any response is seldom, if ever, excusable.").
83. Id. at 104 (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 106-07.
85. Id. at 112.
86. 620 F.2d 186 (8th Cir. 1980).
87. Id. at 189.
88. See, e.g., United States ex rel Marzeno v. Gengler, 574 F.2d 730, 736 (3d Cir. 1978).
89. Id. at 736-37.
90. Pennsylvania ex reL Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51 (1937).
91. Id. at 55.
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In Gregg v. Georgia,9 2 the Court upheld Georgia's capital sentencing
procedure because the procedure provided criteria for considering the
character of the criminal defendant and the circumstances of the crime
committed. 9 3 The Court restated its holding in the landmark case of
Furman v. Georgia 94 that the death penalty could not be imposed arbi-
trarily.9 5 The potential for capriciousness could be eliminated if the
sentencer considered mitigating circumstances in assessing the presence
of aggravating circumstances, thus creating a system that "require[s] as
a prerequisite to the imposition of the death penalty, specific . . .find-
ings as to the circumstances of the crime or the character of the defend-
ant."'9 6 In Roberts v. Louisiana,9 7 the Court again stated that capital
sentencers must consider those mitigating circumstances relevant to
both the offender and the offense and that a Louisiana statute which did
not permit this was unconstitutional.
9 8
The most significant recent case is Lockett v. Ohio.9 9 Sandra Lockett
was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death for a killing
which occurred during a robbery she conspired to commit. ' 0 0 She was
convicted under an Ohio statute that required imposition of the death
penalty for aggravated murder unless a very limited range of mitigating
circumstances was present.10 ' Evidence which the statute prevented the
sentencing court from considering, however, strongly indicated that the
death penalty was inappropriate for Lockett. 10 2 The Court held that,
given the serious and final nature of the death penalty,' 0 3 the sentencer
must consider any mitigating evidence presented by the defendant in as-
sessing the appropriateness of the death penalty.
10 4
92. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
93. Id. at 197-98. See also Proffit v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976);Jurek v. Texas, 428
U.S. 262 (1976).
94. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). (Furman was a per curiam opinion with separate opinions
from each justice).
95. 428 U.S. at 188-89.
96. Id. at 198.
97. 431 U.S. 633 (1977) (Mandatory death penalty statute found unconstitutional); see
also Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). See generally Chaney, 730 F.2d at
1351-52 (citing Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937) for same rule).
98. Roberts, 431 U.S. at 637.
99. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
100. Id. at 589-93. Lockett was also convicted of aggravated robbery.
101. OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.03, 2929.04(B) (1975) require the judge to impose
the death penalty for aggravated murder unless, upon "considering the nature and cir-
cumstances of the offense" and the "history, character, and condition" of the defendant he
finds "by a preponderance of evidence that (1) the victim . .. induced or facilitated the
offense, (2) it was unlikely that [the defendant] would have committed the offense but for
the fact that she 'was under duress, coercion, of strong provocation,' or (3) the offense was
primarily the product of [the defendant's] psychosis or mental deficiency." Lockett, 438
U.S. at 593-94.
102. Lockett was not present at the actual robbery, had no prior felony record, and was
determined by psychological evaluators to be a good candidate for rehabilitation. Id. at
590, 594.
103. Id. at 605.
104. [W]e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the
sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from consid-
ering, as a mitigatingfactor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any
19841
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The Supreme Court has affirmed the importance of the Lockett rule
and the stringency with which it must be applied. First, in Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 10 5 the Court held that a defendant's family background and
psychological profile were admissible at the sentencing hearing to miti-
gate punishment, reversing the lower court's refusal to consider this evi-
dence. 10 6 Second, in Enmund v. Florida,10 7 the Court held that, because
Enmund only drove the getaway car during the course of an armed rob-
bery in which two codefendants killed the victims, the death penalty was
impermissible.' 0 8 Where there was mitigating evidence indicating that
Enmund did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend that killing occur, the
sentencing court must eliminate the death penalty as a sentence
option.10 9
II. CHANEY V. BROWN: THE CLASH OF BRADY-AGURS
AND LOCKET REVEALED
A. Factual Background
The petitioner, Larry Chaney, was convicted of felony first degree
murder for the death of Mrs. Kendal Ashmore. The jury recommended
the death penalty after finding the existence of aggravating circum-
stances, a prerequisite to the death penalty under Oklahoma law."10
The trial judge followed this recommendation. I '
Mrs. Ashmore and her husband Phillip raised Morgan horses on
their farm in Jenks, Oklahoma. For almost a month, a man identifying
himself as Richard Elliot repeatedly called Mrs. Ashmore to discuss hor-
ses. He arranged to meet her in Tulsa, Oklahoma on March 17, 1977,
for further discussion. 1 2 On that date, Mrs. Ashmore and an employee,
Kathy Brown, drove to Tulsa, exchanged their car for the Ashmore's
pickup truck at Mr. Ashmore's office, purchased hay, and went to meet
of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a
sentence less than death.
Id. at 604 (emphasis in the original) (footnotes omitted). See Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95
(1979) (hearsay statements merit consideration in mitigation of punishment if they appear
to be reliable).
105. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
106. Eddings, a sixteen-year old juvenile tried and convicted for murder as an adult,
had a very turbulent childhood and was diagnosed to be highly emotionally disturbed.
The Court, holding it appropriate and necessary to consider these circumstances in deter-
mining his sentence, overturned his death penalty. Id. at 107-08.
107. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
108. Id. at 788.
109. Id. at 797.
110. Chanv. 730 F.2d at 1352 n.24. These circumstances are:
I) diw dlci'ndimi knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one
pl) rson:
2) lw dc lnd l committed the murder for remuneration or the promise of
3) lic miuder was especially heinous, atrocious and cruel; and
4) th le murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful
arIe'INI or prosecution.
See Om|.,\. Siuvr. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12(2), (3), (4), (5) (West 1983).
1Il. riiawy, 730 F.2d at 1335.
112. Id. a|t 1336.
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Mr. Elliot. 1 13 The women were never seen alive again. 14
That evening, Mr. Ashmore received the first of several calls de-
manding ransom to save the women's lives."l 5 He called the F.B.I., who
monitored and traced all subsequent extortion calls. Evidence impli-
cated Chaney as the caller."16 Authorities found the Ashmore truck in
Tulsa on March 18. Chaney was arrested on March 19. A search of his
trailer home produced evidence which also implicated him to be "Mr.
Elliot." 117  Police found the bodies of Kendal Ashmore and Kathy
Brown four days later, buried on property Chaney leased near Sallisaw,
Oklahoma, some one hundred miles southeast of Tulsa." 8
The prosecution's reconstruction of Chaney's actions between
March 17 and March 18, 1977 eventually brought this case before the
Tenth Circuit. Its interpretation of the facts and subsequent theory
were questionable in light of statements made to the F.B.I. by three wit-
nesses shortly after the murders. 19
The prosecution's theory was essentially this: Chaney acted alone
in kidnapping and murdering Mrs. Ashmore and Ms. Brown. Its recon-
struction of the facts was that at 1:00 p.m. on March 17, Chaney met and
kidnapped Mrs. Ashmore and Ms. Brown in Tulsa.' 20 By 4:30 p.m. he
had taken the women to his Sallisaw property, killed them, and buried
them. 12 1 At 4:39 p.m. Chaney made a long distance telephone call from
a convenience store in nearby Sequoyah, Oklahoma. 12 2 He then re-
turned to Tulsa, abandoned the Ashmore truck, and made the first ex-
tortion call to Phillip Ashmore at about 6:00 p.m.
12 3
Chaney based his applications for Post Conviction Relief and a Writ
of Habeas Corpus' 24 on the contradictions between this theory and the
undisclosed witness statements.' 2 5 One witness, Poppy Weaver, stated
113. Chaney v. Brown, No. 83-C-519-BT, slip op. at 5 (N.D. Okla. June 30, 1983).
114. Chaney v. State, 612 P.2d 269, 274 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980) (for subsequent his-
tory, see infra note 131).
115. The caller demanded that $500,000 be left at a local fairgrounds. 730 F.2d at
1337.
116. Id. One call was traced to Chaney's trailer-home and another to a phone booth
from which authorities later lifted his palm print.
117. Id. The evidence consisted of scraps of paper containing the words "Richard El-
oit," [sic] "1 p.m. Thursday," and the Ashmore's phone and street numbers. Id.
118. Id. Both women had been bound and strangled.
119. Id. at 1347. See infra text accompanying notes 125-28.
120. Though the prosecution never explicitly stated this, it strongly inferred this chain
of events during its closing argument. Record at 1173-75; Chaney, 730 F.2d at 1337-38.
121. Again, this is not explicitly stated but clearly represents the prosecution's theory
of events. Record at 1173-75; Chaney, 730 F.2d at 1337-38.
122. Chaney, 730 F.2d at 1338, 1348.
123. Once again, this is not explicitly stated but rather inferred by the prosecution. Id.
at 1337; Record at 1174-76; see also Chaney v. State, No. CRF-77-756, slip op. at 6 (D.C.
Tulsa 1981).
124. Chaney v. Brown, No. 83-C-519-B, slip op. (N.D. Okla. 1983). See also Brief in
Support of Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody filed in
Chaney v. Brown, No. 83-C-519-B (N.D. Okla. 1983).
125. Chaney's counsel, Allen Smallwood, learned of these statements when they were
released to a Tulsa newspaper following a Freedom of Information Act request. Chaney,
730 F.2d at 1346. Smallwood had previously requested production of all such statements
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that on March 17 at 4:10 p.m. she saw Mrs. Ashmore in Jenks,
Oklahoma, in the Ashmore pickup, with a man and another woman.1
2 6
Jenks is approximately one hundred miles from Sequoyah, where Cha-
ney made a telephone call at 4:39 p.m. after allegedly killing and burying
Ashmore and Brown. 12 7 Clearly, if Mrs. Ashmore and Ms. Brown were
alive in Jenks at 4:10 p.m., they were not dead in Sallisaw at 4:39 p.m.
The second and third witnesses' statements contradicted the prosecu-
tion's theory that Chaney had returned the Ashmore truck to Tulsa and
abandoned it on the evening of March 17 before making the first extor-
tion call. 1
28
Combined, these statements rendered questionable the prosecu-
tion's assertion that Chaney had acted alone.' 29 They indicated that
someone else, an accomplice, had taken Mrs. Ashmore and Ms. Brown
to Chaney's property and killed them, then returned the Ashmore truck
to Tulsa. Meanwhile, Chaney had already left his property, returned to
Tulsa, and begun making extortion calls.1
3 0
B. The Opinion
The Chaney case reached the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals after a
series of unsuccessful appeals in both Oklahoma and the federal
courts.'31 The court first considered Chaney's claim that his request for
in a very detailed Motion to Produce dated April 1, 1977. See Chaney, Petitioner's Opening
Brief, Appendix B. For exerpts from this motion see infra note 136.
126. Ms. Weaver recognized both Mrs. Ashmore and the Ashmore's truck because she
and the Ashmores were long-time neighbors. 730 F.2d at 1347.
127. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
128. Kyle West, a Tulsa high school student, rode in a school bus past the spot where
the Ashmore truck was abandoned after the time the prosecution alleged Chaney aban-
doned it. He saw only a red pickup truck. J. C. Hamilton saw someone get out of a blue
and white pickup at 8:15 a.m. on March 18 and leave in a second car, presumably driven by
a second person. The F.B.I. did not recover the Ashmore truck until 9:00 a.m. that morn-
ing. Chaney, 730 F.2d at 1347-48.
129. Record at 1285; Chaney, 730 F.2d at 1352-53.
130. With regard to those calls, Mr. Ashmore provided further evidence that Chaney
did not act alone. He told the F.B.I. that during the first, unrecorded call the caller told
him, "There are four of us. We're not kidding." 730 F.2d at 1347-48 (emphasis in the
original).
131. Chaney appealed the decision of the trial court to the Oklahoma Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals, which affirmed. Chaney v. State, 612 P.2d 269 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980). He
then applied unsuccessfully to the United States Supreme Court for a Writ of Certiorari.
Chaney v. Oklahoma, 450 U.S. 1025 (1981). He applied twice for post-conviction relief,
which was twice denied. Chaney v. State, No. CRF-77-756 (D.C. Tulsa July 27, 1981),
Chaney v. State, No. PC-81-345 (Okla. Crim. App. Nov. 12, 1981). He then reapplied for
and was again denied a Writ of Certiorari from the Supreme Court. Chaney v. Oklahoma,
456 U.S. 919 (1982).
Subsequently, Chaney petitioned for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, which was denied for
failure to exhaust state remedies. Chaney v. Oklahoma, No. 82-C-625-B (N.D. Okla. June
25, 1982). He then reapplied for and was denied post-conviction relief. Chaney v. State,
No. CRF-77-756 (D.C. Tulsa Aug. 9, 1982). The ruling was affirmed. Chaney v. State, No.
PC-82-487 (Okla. Crim. App. Feb. 3, 1983).
A third petition for Writ of Certiorari and a Motion for Stay of Execution were denied
four months later. Chaney v. Oklahoma, 51 U.S.L.W 3872 (U.S. June 7, 1983). On June
15, 1983, Chaney petitioned the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Oklahoma for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and an evidentiary hearing. In a 92 page opinion,
both claims were denied. Chaney v. Brown, No. 83-C-519-BT (N.D. Okla. June 30, 1983).
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exculpatory evidence was specific under the standards of Agurs,13 2 and
that the prosecution's failure to disclose the F.B.I. statements' 33 entitled
him to a Writ of Habeas Corpus.' 3 4 Upon examining and extensively
quoting Chaney's Motion to Produce, 13 5 the court concluded that the
request placed the prosecution on notice of the exact information Cha-
ney sought, thus conforming to the Agurs definition of a specific re-
quest. 136 The court also followed earlier rulings and held that the
specificity of the written motion for production must be evaluated in
light of the hearings held on the motion and the trial court's subsequent
production orders. 1
3 7
Second, the court held that the Oklahoma court committed error by
failing to consider whether the requested undisclosed evidence might
have affected the outcome of Chaney's sentencing hearing.' 3 8 Even if
the lower court had considered this evidence, any decision it reached,
contrary to the state's argument, would not have been entitled to a pre-
sumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 13 9 The Tenth Cir-
cuit held that such a decision presented a mixed question of fact and
Chaney appealed this ruling to the Tenth Circuit, which accepted the case and issued a
Stay of Execution pending appeal. Chaney v. Brown, 712 F.2d 441 (10th Cir. 1983). See
Chaney, 730 F.2d at 1338-39; Petitioners' Opening Brief at 1-3; Brief of Appellee at 1-3.
132. For discussion of the Agurs specific request standard, see supra notes 81-85 and
accompanying text.
133. See supra note 125-28 and accompanying text.
134. See Petitioner's Opening Brief at 10-26.
135. Chaney, 730 F.2d at 1340-42. See Motion to Produce filed April 1, 1977,
Oklahoma v. Chaney, No. CRF-77-704, CRF-77-705 (D.C. Tulsa 1977).
136. Chaney, 730 F.2d at 1341-44. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106-07. The following exerpts
from the Motion to Produce provide excellent guidance as to what constituted a specific
request:
1. Statements of all persons who were interviewed by an agent of the State of
Oklahoma, an investigator or member of the Tulsa Police Department or the
Tulsa County Sheriff's Office or any other governmental agency in connec-
tion with the subject matter or this case, whether or not the state intends to
call them to testify at trial or not.
2. Stenographic recordings or transcriptions of any oral statement made by
any person to an agent of the State, an investigator or police officer at the
Tulsa Police Department, a member of the Tulsa County Sheriff's Office or a
member of any other governmental agency in connection with the subject
matter of the case, whether or not (a) the stenographic recordings or tran-
scriptions are a substantially verbatim recital of the statement, or (b) the
statement was recorded contemporaneously with its making, or (c) the state-
ment relates to the proposed subject matter of the testimony of the witness
to be used at trial.
4. The names and addresses of all persons who may have some knowledge of
the facts involved in the instant case.
13. Any and all oral statements made to any member of the Tulsa Police Depart-
ment or District Attorney's staff or any other law enforcement official.
Chaney, 730 F.2d at 1340.
137. Chaney, 730 F.2d at 1344. See United States v. Gaston, 608 F.2d 607 (5th Cir.
1979).
138. Chaney, 730 F.2d at 1344-45.
139. Id. at 1345-46. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 states, in relevant part, that in federal habeas
corpus proceedings the factual findings of a state court shall be presumed correct until or
unless it is established that the facts were inadequately developed or that the petitioner
was deprived of a "full, fair, and adequate hearing," or denied due process. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(a), (d)(3),(6),(7). See also Brief of Appellee at 13-2 1; Petitioner's Reply Brief at 2-4.
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law, and was therefore open to federal review. 140
Third, the court held that the undisclosed F.B.I. statements would
not have affected Chaney's conviction for first degree murder. 14 1 The
statements indicated that Chaney was guilty of kidnapping which re-
sulted in death. 142 Like most states' felony murder statutes, Oklahoma's
statute permits conviction of first degree murder when death occurs
during the commission of certain enumerated felonies, including kid-
napping, regardless of whether death was intended. 143 It also permits
one who is merely an accomplice to these felonies to be convicted of first
degree murder for a death which occurs during their commission. 144
Fourth, and most important, the court found that the F.B.I. state-
ments the prosecution withheld on the good-faith supposition that they
were not exculpatory' 4 5 were in fact exculpatory. 14 6 They might have
affected the jury's recommendation that the death penalty be imposed
because they implicated at least one other person in the kidnapping and
murder of Ashmore and Brown. 14 7 The jury had based its conclusions
regarding the existence of aggravating circumstances upon the supposi-
tion-and the prosecution's insistence14 8 -that Chaney had acted
alone. 14
9
The court also held that the prosecution's failure to provide the
F.B.I. statements denied Chaney his Lockett right to present any mitigat-
ing evidence at sentencing. 150 First, the undisclosed statements met the
Green v. Georgia15 ' standard allowing courts to consider reliable hearsay
statements in mitigation of punishment. 1 52 Second, examined for their
140. Chaney, 730 F.2d at 1345-46. An in-depth evaluation of this aspect of the court's
decision is beyond the scope of this comment.
141. Id. at 1349-51.
142. Id. at 1350.
143. Id. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701B (West 1983).
144. Chaney, 730 F.2d at 1350. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 172 (West 1983).
145. 730 F.2d at 1348.
146. Id. at 1357.
147. Id. at 1352. Because the court found that Chaney's request for evidence was spe-
cific, the standard of materiality for the evidence which the prosecutor did not disclose
following this request was whether that undisclosed evidence might have affected the jury's
decision. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106.
148. Record at 1285. See Chaney, 730 F.2d at 1352, 1357.
149. Id. at 1352. See Petitioner's Opening Brief at 27-36; Petitioner's Reply Brief at 12-
13 and Exhibit A.
150. Id. at 1351.
151. 442 U.S. 95 (1979).
152. After making her statement to the F.B.I. and before Chaney's trial, Poppy Weaver
changed part of her statement, saying she could not identify the woman she saw as Kendal
Ashmore. However, Ms. Weaver made her statement within five days of seeing Mrs. Ash-
more, indicating that her recollections were fresh and accurate. Also, she precisely identi-
fied the time she saw Mrs. Ashmore based on hearing police cars and fire trucks passing
(which were stipulated to have passed her location at the time she said they did), a further
indication of accurate recall on her part. Id. at 1354. Relying on Green, the court held that,
since the statements went to the critical issue of punishment and appeared reliable, they
were admissible under the recorded recollection exception to the hearsay rule despite Ms.
Weaver's failure to confirm them. Id.
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cumulative effect as required by United States ex rel Marzeno v. Gengler, 1
53
the statements indicated that Chaney was only an accomplice to the kill-
ings. The court held that since they created doubt that Chaney had
killed, attempted to kill, or intended that killing occur, his death sen-
tence could not stand in light of Enmund.154 Consequently, the court
affirmed Chaney's conviction, reversed and enjoined his death sentence,
and remanded for either imposition of a life sentence or, if the prosecu-
tion still desired to pursue the death penalty, for a new sentencing hear-
ing or a retrial on all issues, as the Oklahoma courts saw fit to
require. 155
III. CHANEY V. BROWN: ANALYSIS
A. The Tenth Circuit Chose the Lockett Standard of Disclosure
The Tenth Circuit's opinion in Chaney v. Brown is a sound decision
given the complete lack of precedent to guide it in integrating the Brady-
Agurs and Lockett lines of decisions.1 56 Nevertheless, the court was con-
fronted with an impossible task; the standards of these lines are irrecon-
cilable and reveal the Supreme Court's inconsistent handling of
discovery in criminal proceedings. If the Supreme Court continues to
adhere to its own espoused goal of assuring criminal defendants fair tri-
als, 157 it should remove the barrier it has placed before this goal: its
failure to open prosecutors' files to unrestrained defense inspection.
Chaney was entitled, based on Lockett, to present any mitigating cir-
cumstances in an attempt to avoid the death penalty.' 58 His ability to
exercise this right depended on the obligation imposed on prosecutors
by Brady and Agurs to reveal exculpatory evidence. The Agurs specific
request standard requires the prosecution to disclose all requested evi-
dence which might affect the outcome of the trial as to either verdict or
punishment. 159
At first glance, "any" and "might affect" appear synonymous, or so
alike that any difference is negligible. A closer evaluation based on the
facts of Chaney shows the illusory nature of this apparent harmony. The
prosecutor in Chaney, when called by Chaney's counsel to testify at a
153. 574 F.2d 730, 736 (3d Cir. 1978). See supra notes 88 & 89 and accompanying text.
Chaney, 730 F.2d at 1356.
154. 730 F.2d at 1356-57. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
155. 730 F.2d at 1359. The court concluded that it was unnecessary to grant Chaney's
request for a federal evidentiary hearing because his death sentence could not stand, ren-
dering such a hearing moot. Id. at 1358. See also Petitioner's Opening Brief at 36-40; Brief
of Appellee at 30-33; Petitioner's Reply Brief at 13. However, the court held that the
death penalty might be reinstated after further proceedings if the mitigating factors were
determined not to eliminate one or more of the aggravating circumstances required by
Oklahoma law. See supra note 110.
156. The Tenth Circuit noted that, where integration of the Brady-Agurs and Lockett
lines was concerned, Chaney v. Brown was a case of first impression. Chaney 730 F.2d at
1336.
157. See supra note 2.
158. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604. See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
159. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104. See supra text accompanying notes 81-83.
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post-conviction relief hearing, stated that he did not disclose the F.B.I.
statements in question because he believed they were not exculpa-
tory. 160 Rephrased to comply with the language of Agurs, he did not
believe they might affect the outcome of the trial. The flaw in the Agurs
standard is laid bare: it does not eliminate continued exercise of
prosecutorial subjectivity in determining what evidence should be or
must be disclosed. A standard truly requiring the disclosure of any ex-
culpatory evidence would have eliminated this subjectivity.
The Tenth Circuit implicitly found the Agurs standard inferior to the
Lockett standard. It determined that even if the withheld F.B.I. state-
ments were hearsay contradicted by live testimony, they were admissible
for their potential mitigating effect.' 6l In reaching this conclusion, the
court adhered to the Supreme Court's stringent application of the Lock-
ett holding in subsequent cases such as Enmund. 162 It acted to condemn
and eliminate prosecutorial discretion and subjectivity of any kind in
criminal discovery. "Any" indeed means all in Chaney, just as it did in
Lockett. Thus, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the Lockett standard of
disclosure is (1) higher than the Agurs standard and (2) controls the de-
fendant's right to know what favorable evidence is in the prosecutor's
possession.
B. The Supreme Court Should Open Prosecutors' Files
One commentator has pointed out that prosecutors' possessiveness
of evidence in their possession is the central barrier to open discovery in
criminal cases. 163 Evidence in criminal cases is unique; physical evi-
dence in particular cannot be duplicated. 64 Given the state's role as
investigator of crimes and its resultant superior fact-gathering appara-
tus, 165 it usually discovers and acts as custodian of the evidence in crimi-
nal cases. This superiority and the Constitution's orientation towards
protecting the criminal defendant from intimidation and improper pun-
ishment 16 6 demand that the defendant be given every opportunity to
160. Chaney, 730 F.2d at 1348.
161. Id. at 1354.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 99-109.
163. See Beatty, supra note 15, at 242.
164. Beatty notes:
It has been suggested that "[s]uppressed evidence would not be a major
problem if the defendant had facilities adequate to gather his own evidence
before the trial." But that is not really correct. Assume both parties have ade-
quate investigatory staffs, but there is only one used bullet to find in a case.
Should the party who finds the bullet be able to withhold that item of evidence
from the trial process because it belongs to them or because the other party failed
to request it?
Id. (quoting Note, The Prosecutors' Constitutional Duty to Reveal Evidence to the Defendant, 74
YALE L.J. 136, 142-43 (1964)).
165. For an excellent discussion of the relative advantage of the state over the defend-
ant in criminal discovery, see Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in
Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1180-92 (1960). See also Application of Kapatos, 208
F. Supp. 883, 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
166. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (the state cannot convict the accused of crime based on
improperly seized evidence); amend. V (the state cannot try the accused for the same of-
fense twice, the accused is protected from self-incrimination, the state may not deprive the
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assess all the evidence against him and either mount a defense or con-
front the likelihood of his conviction and attempt to plea bargain.'
6 7
One critic of only partially opened prosecutors' files suggests that any
system designed to settle disputes between parties will produce proper
and desirable resolutions only when the facts giving rise to the dispute
are available to both parties.' 6 8 At least one nation, the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, is in agreement. It has completely opened prosecutors'
files to defense inspection in an effort not only to produce desirable res-
olutions in criminal proceedings but also to streamline the criminal pro-
cess. Its decision to do so has brought positive results in both areas. 169
The most significant drawback of the Agurs disclosure standard is
precisely the problem the Tenth Circuit recognized and sought to cor-
rect: it is frequently impossible for a prosecutor to assess correctly the
mitigating potential of a given piece of evidence. 170 In fact, one com-
mentator has suggested that most prosecutors lack even threshold
knowledge of the nature and purpose of exculpatory evidence or of their
responsibility to identify and reveal it.' 7 1 If this is a realistic assessment,
and it appears to be, what are the defendant's chances of receiving evi-
dence which is unknown to her? Justice Fortas was quick to point out in
Giles v. Maryland that her chances are slim if not eliminated entirely.1
7 2
He concluded, as the Tenth Circuit concluded implicitly in Chaney, that
it is improper to judge the fairness of the criminal defendant's trial by
the type of request the defense has submitted' 73-by the ability of de-
fense counsel to play "Twenty Questions."'
174
Chaney and the decisions underlying it lead to the conclusion that
accused of life, liberty or property without due process of law); amend. VI (the accused has
the right to a speedy, public, jury trial, to be informed of the charges against him, to be
represented by counsel, and to subpoena witnesses); amend. VIII (no excessive bail or
fines, no cruel and unusual punishments); amend. XIV (making the above amendments
applicable to and binding upon the states). For a discussion of this "selective incorpora-
tion" and extensive citation to relevant cases, seeJ. NOWAK, K. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 452-60 (1983)).
167. One commentator has even said that, in the pretrial phase, plea bargaining cannot
be realistically explored by the defendant if she cannot examine the complete case against
her, including all evidence. Absent such disclosure, an informed plea is not possible.
Comment, Disclosure to the Guilty Pleading Defendant: Brady v. Maryland and the Brady Trilogy,
72J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 165 (1981).
168. Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 56 (1961).
169. In fact, the defense can "motion the prosecution to investigate (at public expense)
any defensive claims and evidence that might have been overlooked" (footnote omitted).
Langbein, Lard Without Plea Bargaining How the Germans Do It, 78 MIcH. L. REv. 204, 207-
08 (1979).
170. See Note, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Reveal Evidence to the Defendant, 74
YALE L.J. 136, 147 (1964).
171. See Beatty, supra note 15, at 243, n.35 (A U.S. Attorney had addressed a group of
New York prosecutors and presented to them a fact pattern involving a bank robbery
where only one of six witnesses said the defendant was not the robber. He then asked for
a show of hands by those who thought they would be obligated under Brady to disclose
that witness and her opinion to defense counsel. Only two in a large group raised their
hands, leading the U.S. attorney to the understated conclusion that "the obligation to
disclose favorable evidence is not one fully appreciated by all prosecutors.")
172. See supra note 57.
173. Id.
174. See Beatty, supra note 15, at 242.
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fairness in criminal cases will be assured only when the Supreme Court
properly and fully imposes the Lockett disclosure standard on the entire
criminal process by opening prosecutors' files to unfettered defense in-
spection. This is the standard applicable in civil discovery virtually with-
out exception, yet the penalties faced by "convicted" civil litigants are
distinctly less onerous than those faced by convicted criminals.175 It is
time the Court grants to criminal defendants the fair trials it has said are
their constitutional right.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S DENIAL OF CERTIORARI IN CHANEY V.
BROWN: THE MAJORITY DECLINES TO OPEN PROSECUTORS'
FILES WHILE THE MINORITY FORESHADOWS
POSSIBLE DIMINISHMENT OF THE
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL
Six members of the Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari in
Chaney v. Brown. 176 This decision has two ramifications which ultimately
raise more questions than they answer. First, the Tenth Circuit's deci-
sion, favoring the Lockett standard over the Brady-Agurs standard, con-
trols the prosecutor's duty to disclose exculpatory evidence in the Tenth
Circuit. This holding clarifies the definition of a specific request, en-
hancing the defendant's opportunity to receive both a fair trial and a fair
sentencing hearing. There is not, however, a uniform standard binding
on all courts. Second, and more important, the denial of certiorari sug-
gests that there currently is not a majority of justices who believe that
fair trials can only be assured by opening prosecutors' files to unfettered
defense inspection. It is possible that the Court's denial of certiorari
represents a compromise between one contingent ofJustices who would
have opened prosecutors' files and a second who would not entertain so
significant a change in prior law, but equally would not be party to the
further constriction of due process advocated by the minority in Chief
Justice Burger's dissent.
That dissent suggests a disturbing possibility: any change in the
composition of the court adding to ChiefJustice Burger's activist contin-
gent could lead not only to the overruling of Lockett but also could result
in a drastic diminishment of the Brady-Agurs standard.
The dissent argues that certiorari should be granted to resolve two
issues: what distinguishes a specific from a general request and what
criteria determine whether undisclosed evidence is material in the sen-
tencing phase of trial.17 7 After a brief review of the facts, the Chief Jus-
tice concludes that, while the F.B.I. statements "arguably should have
been disclosed," they would not overturn either Chaney's guilt or sen-
tence because "none are relevant to rebut an inference that [Chaney]
175. Civil penalties are nearly always economic. Though they may be burdensome,
they do not jeopardize one's life or physical liberty.
176. Brown v. Chaney, 53 U.S.L.W. 3433 (U.S. Dec. 10, 1984). This decision will here-
after be cited as Brown to distinguish it from the decision of the Tenth Circuit.
177. Id. at 3433.
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intended that the victims be killed."' 178 He states that the Tenth Circuit
failed to address Chaney's intent as revealed by the threatening nature
of Chaney's extortion calls to Mr. Ashmore.' 79 This overlooks the fact
that neither the Tenth Circuit nor the trial court addressed the possibil-
ity that Chaney was bluffing to assure delivery of the ransom money,
never intending that an accomplice would kill Ashmore and Brown. The
Chief Justice thus ignores the holding of Enmund.18
0
In discussing the first issue, the dissent acknowledges the dilemma
created by the Agurs standard because "not all requests fall into obvious
,specific' or 'general' categories."' 8 1 It continues, however, to state that
the Tenth Circuit improperly held Chaney's request for production of
all F.B.I. statements was specific because the request failed to give notice
"of the defendant['s] interest in a particular piece of evidence." 182 In the
same discussion, the dissent acknowledges that the defense may be una-
ware of the prosecutor's possession of exculpatory evidence. 18 3 The
Chief Justice argues, though, that Agurs adequately "addressed this di-
lemma by requiring some information to be released where there was only
a general request or no request at all."' 18 4 The dissent's conclusion,
then, is that Chaney's request was general because he failed to request
particular evidence. The fact that his request was general because he
was unaware of what the prosecution possessed was unimportant; how-
ever, if the withheld statements were truly relevant and material the
prosecution would have disclosed them anyway under the general re-
quest standard of Agurs.
The danger inherent in the dissent's argument is self-evident; it re-
vives the precise problem the Tenth Circuit sought to eliminate by
adopting the Lockett standard: prosecutorial subjectivity in evaluating
the importance to the defense of evidence in the prosecution's exclusive
possession. What is "some information"? Does it include the implica-
tion arising from four separate F.B.I. witness statements that a defend-
ant may not be a murderer, as in Chaney? According to Chief Justice
Burger's dissent, it does not.
In considering the second issue, the Chief Justice implies that a
Court dominated by those sharing his views would hold the Brady-Agurs
standard inapplicable to the nondisclosure of mitigating evidence in the
sentencing phase of trial.' 85 He suggests that reconsideration of a de-
fendant's sentence when a nondisclosure affects the severity of that sen-
tence could in the future depend not on whether a violation occurred
178. Id. at 3433, 3434 n.9.
179. The caller, presumed to be Chaney based on circumstantial evidence, told Ash-
more that "Mrs. Ashmore would be 'dead' or pieces of her body returned in a box if the
ransom request was not complied with. ... Id. at 3434 n.9. See supra note 116.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 107-09.
181. Brown, 53 U.S.L.W. at 3434.
182. Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. Jackson, 388 Mass. 98, 110, 445 N.E.2d 1033, 1040
(1983)) (emphasis added by the ChiefJustice).
183. Brown, 53 U.S.L.W. at 3434 (quoting Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106).
184. Id. (emphasis added).
185. Id.
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but on the appropriateness of the sentence imposed "in light of all the
evidence."' 18 6 Again, the diminishment of the defendant's due process
rights which would result from such a standard is readily apparent. This
rule, if promulgated by the Court at a later date, will eliminate the rule
of Lockett that reconsideration of sentencing is merited whenever any
mitigating evidence is not disclosed.' 8 7 The dissent implies that it
would require the defendant to show that undisclosed mitigating evi-
dence was "material" before it would reconsider any sentence, even a
capital sentence.18 8 If such were the case, a court rather than a jury
would determine the materiality of the undisclosed evidence. The dis-
senters in Agurs cogently argued that allowing a judge to determine what
mitigating evidence would have affected a jury's recommendation to im-
pose capital punishment would be fundamentally unfair. 1
89
In his concluding paragraph, the Chief Justice states that the prose-
cutor has an "interest in avoiding premature or excessive discovery of
his files."190 He apparently concludes that this interest mandates a nar-
rower interpretation of Agurs than the Tenth Circuit's interpretation. 19
It is difficult to imagine what this interest is, however, since the court
stated in Agurs that the prosecutor's "overriding interest [is] that 'justice
shall be done,' ",192 and, further, that "the prudent prosecutor will re-
solve doubtful questions [concerning whether to disclose evidence] in
favor of disclosure."' 19 3 Chief Justice Burger's interpretation of what
constitutes due process in terms of evidentiary disclosure perpetuates
the specter of courts erroneously meting out capital sentences without
first providing defendants every opportunity to demonstrate that such
sentences are inappropriate. The only sure means of exorcising this
specter from criminal jurisprudence is to open prosecutor's files to un-
fettered defense inspection.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has held that criminal defendants are constitu-
tionally entitled to fair trials. In order to assure fair trials, it has re-
quired, in certain circumstances, that prosecutors disclose exculpatory
186. Id.
187. See supra text accompanying note 104.
188. Brown, 53 U.S.L.W. at 3434.
189. Under today's ruling, if the prosecution has not made knowing use of perjury,
and if the defense has not made a specific request for an item of information, the
defendant is entitled to a new trial only if the withheld evidence actually creates a
reasonable doubt as to guilt in the judge's mind. With all respect, this rule is com-
pletely at odds with the overriding interest in assuring that evidence tending to
show innocence is brought to the jury's attention. The rule creates little, if any,
incentive for the prosecutor conscientiously to determine whether his files con-
tain evidence helpful to the defense.
Agurs, 427 U.S. at 117 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). See generally id. at 117-
120.
190. Brown, 53 U.S.L.W. at 3435.
191. Id.
192. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110-11 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88
(1935)) (emphasis added).
193. Id. at 108.
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evidence. The Court has failed to assure fair trials, however, because it
has promulgated two ineffective standards to determine the amount of
disclosure to which the defendant is entitled. The Brady-Agurs standard
detracts from assuring fair trials by basing the defendant's right to evi-
dence in the prosecutor's possession upon the specificity of his request
for that evidence. The Lockett standard endeavors to assure fair trials by
requiring that the defense be allowed to present any mitigating circum-
stances to aid the defendant, but that standard has heretofore applied
only to the sentencing phase of capital offense proceedings. Further-
more, the amount of prosecutorial evidence which the defense will have
even at the sentencing stage of the defendant's trial depends upon the
disclosure requirements imposed on the prosecution at the beginning of
the proceedings by the Brady-Agurs discovery standard. Thus, given the
Court's history of placing a high premium on fair trials, neither standard
adequately protects the criminal defendant's right to a fair trial.
Chaney v. Brown brought these standards together for the first time.
The facts of the case demonstrate that the Brady-Agurs standard contin-
ues to permit prosecutors to exercise discretion in disclosing evidence.
This leads to the nondisclosure of evidence which the defense must re-
ceive if the defendant is to exercise effectively his Lockett rights. The
Tenth Circuit attempted to integrate the Brady-Agurs and Lockett stan-
dards, but implicitly found this impossible and concluded that the Lockett
standard should control prosecutorial disclosure throughout the crimi-
nal process. In order to enforce this proper conclusion, the Supreme
Court should guarantee the application of the Lockett standard by open-
ing prosecutors' files to unconditional defense inspection.
Unfortunately, by denying certiorari, the Court implicitly declined
to open prosecutors' files or to promulgate a uniform standard of disclo-
sure. Moreover, ChiefJustice Burger's dissent from the denial of certio-
rari suggests that the imminent realignment of the Court may further
dim the prospects for full disclosure and truly fair criminal trials. The
dissenters apparently would not only eliminate the rule in Lockett but
also greatly narrow the Bradv-Agurs line. To the extent the Court limits
the defendant's right to such disclosure, it diminishes her prospects of
receiving a fair trial.
Steven C. Choquette
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